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Credence  goods  are  characterized  by  informational  asymmetries  between  sellers  and 
consumers  that  invite  fraudulent  behavior  by  sellers.  This  paper  presents  the  results  of  a 
natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of 
fraud and to examine the influence of passengers’ presumed information and income on the 
extent  of  fraud.  Results  reveal  that  taxi  drivers  cheat  passengers  in  systematic  ways: 
Passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while 
asymmetric information on the local tariff system leads to manipulated bills. Higher income 
seems to lead to more fraud. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many goods and services, such as car or computer repairs, medical treatments or taxi 
rides in an unknown city, share the characteristic of an informational asymmetry between the 
seller and the consumer. Typically, the seller knows more than the consumer about the quality 
that yields the highest surplus from trade, and moreover the consumer is frequently not even 
ex post able to observe the quality of the good or service he received. . These features have 
led Darby and Karni (1973) to create the term “credence goods”, because consumers are not 
able to monitor quality. 
Such informational asymmetries open the door to a whole array of different types of 
fraudulent  behavior  on  the  sellers’  side  (Dulleck  and  Kerschbamer,  2006),  including 
overtreatment (providing a higher quality than the surplus maximizing one), undertreatment 
(choosing a quality that is insufficient to satisfy the consumer’s needs), and overcharging 
(charging for a higher quality than has been provided). Fraud in markets for credence goods 
has potentially large efficiency costs for an economy. For instance, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation has estimated that more than half of the total expenses for car repairs are for 
unnecessary  repairs,  which  can  be  taken  as  a  rough  estimate  of  the  efficiency  costs  of 
overtreatment (Wolinsky, 1993). Referring to the health care sector, a Swiss study has found 
that the average person’s probability of receiving one of seven major surgical interventions is 
one third above that of a physician or a member of a physician’s family, indicating that a 
consumer’s  (presumed)  education  or  information  level  affects  the  quality  of  the  received 
treatment  and  therewith  the  likelihood  of  under-  and  overtreatment  (Domenighetti  et  al., 
1993). A Japanese study has revealed that doctors’ prescriptions respond to differences in 
mark-up across different drugs, i.e., to monetary incentives that are unrelated to warranted 
medication (Iizuka, 2007). 
Yet,  the  complexity  of  services  such  as  medical  treatments  or  car  repair  services 
remains an obstacle to unambiguously measuring the extent of fraud. In fact, “mistreatment” 
in such markets could be driven by causes unrelated to fraud. For instance, an overly cautious 
car mechanic (physician) might be prone to conducting repairs (doing check-ups) prematurely 
in the best intention to prolong the lifetime of a car or patient, respectively. Moreover, it is 
difficult  to  detect  and  quantify  the  amount  of  overcharging  through  sellers  charging  for 
services that have not been provided.
1 
                                                 
1 In the case of car repairs, overcharging can occur through inflating the time spent on the repair or charging for 
goods and services that have not been provided at all (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). While in the health 
 3 
From  a  policy  perspective,  a  better  understanding  of  the  extent  of  fraud  and  its 
determinants in credence goods markets is important in order to design appropriate incentive 
structures or regulatory frameworks. In this paper, we present the results of a natural field 
experiment  designed  to  identify  the  extent  and  type  of  fraud  and  their  determinants  in  a 
market for a credence good. More precisely, our field experiment focuses on the market for 
taxi rides. In this market, confounding factors present in other credence goods markets – such 
as issues of misdiagnosis or incompetence of the expert seller, overly cautious behavior, or 
the inexistence of services that solve a consumer’s problem – are practically non-existent. In 
addition, undertreatment by failing to reach the requested destination is hardly an issue, and 
overtreatment is easy to identify for an informed external observer since unnecessary detours 
are unlikely to add any value for the customer. Given those features of the market for taxi 
rides, the present paper contributes to the literature on fraudulent behavior on markets for 
credence goods in two substantial ways. 
First, running a field experiment in a market for taxi rides allows us to identify the 
extent of fraud and to disentangle it into the two dimensions overtreatment and overcharging. 
We do so by letting three experimenters take taxi rides in the capital city of Greece, Athens, a 
city with approximately 4 million inhabitants and 14,000 taxis. In total, the experimenters 
took 174 rides, with a total driving distance of more than 2,200 km and an overall duration of 
63 hours of taxi driving. For each single ride, a portable GPS satellite logger allowed us to 
precisely record the chosen route and the taxi’s exact position and speed at each second of the 
ride. With these data, we can quantify overtreatment in the form of detours. The GPS data are 
also the key to measuring overcharging, because they allow calculating the correct fare for a 
given distance. The difference between the total fare charged by the taxi driver and the correct 
fare then measures the amount of overcharging. 
Second, and in our view even more important, we study how the extent and the type of 
fraud  in  the  market  for  taxi  rides  depend  on  key  characteristics  of  a  passenger.  In  our 
experimental treatments, we manipulate the taxi driver’s perception about the passenger’s (i) 
information about the city and the optimal route, (ii) information about the tariff system, and 
(iii) income.  
                                                                                                                                                          
care sector overcharging can occur in analogous ways, the incentives for overcharging are exacerbated there 
since overcharging is of little immediate concern to consumers if obligatory social security systems bear the 
costs of medical treatment. Overcharging is a problem for insurers, however, as they have no easy means of 
controlling what kind of service has actually been provided to patients. 4 
We let the three experimenters always ask for the same service at almost the same 
time by departing one by one from the same starting point to the same destination. In each 
triple, two of the experimenters spoke in Greek to the taxi driver, while the third one spoke in 
English. An experimenter in the role of an English speaking passenger and one experimenter 
in the role of a Greek speaking passenger stated the destination and asked whether the driver 
knew the address, adding as an explanation for asking that they were not familiar with the 
city. The other Greek speaking passenger, however, only stated the destination, but did not 
say  or  ask  anything  else.  The  purpose  of  this  treatment  variation  was  to  manipulate  the 
driver’s  perception  of  the  passenger’s  familiarity  with  the  city.  We  hypothesized  that 
passengers revealing that they were unfamiliar with the city would be more prone to being 
taken on detours. 
Varying the passenger’s language (Greek versus English) was meant to manipulate a 
driver’s  perception  of  the  passenger’s  familiarity  with  the  details  of  the  local  taxi  tariff 
system. Since taxi tariffs are subject to the same regulation all over Greece, speaking Greek 
was meant to convey to the driver that the passenger is likely to know the general rules for 
charging, such as when the daytime-tariff applies, or what kind of surcharges are allowed for 
which services. Since an English speaking passenger is arguably less likely to be perceived as 
familiar with the details of the Greek taxi tariff system, we hypothesized that taxi drivers try 
to exploit their informational advantage in the  charging dimension more extensively with 
English speaking than with Greek speaking passengers.
2 
Finally, we tried to manipulate a driver’s perception of the passenger’s income by 
varying the passenger’s clothes and the requested destination. Passengers in the high income 
role always wore a suit and carried a briefcase, while passengers in the low income role were 
dressed in casual clothes and carried a backpack. If the respective destination was a hotel, it 
was either an expensive top-end hotel for high-income passengers or a cheap hostel for low-
income passengers. Assuming that taxi drivers have convex distributional preferences, our 
hypothesis was that high-income passengers were more likely to be cheated upon by taxi 
drivers. 
                                                 
2  It  is  a  long  established  pattern  in  linguistics  that  people  tend  to  infer  (correctly  or  incorrectly)  private 
information from speech. In a classic field experiment, Kingsbury (1968) asked randomly selected pedestrians 
on a Boston street for directions to a department store. He asked his question in either the local Boston dialect, 
or employing a dialect spoken in rural Missouri. The results showed that in the latter case the directions given 
were significantly longer and more detailed than in the former case. Apparently, on the basis of his foreign 
dialect alone, people assumed that his level of local expertise was low, and reacted on that in their responses. 5 
Our field experiment provides a number of advantages compared to other approaches 
to  examine  expert  sellers’  behavior  on  credence  goods  markets.
3  Compared  to  non-
experimental field studies like those discussed on the opening page, it allows for a systematic 
variation of treatment variables, while still investigating the behavior of real expert sellers in 
their natural working environment. Compared to laboratory experiments, external validity is 
practically of no concern in a natural field experiment.
4 
We  are  aware  of  only  one  previous  field  experiment  in  a  credence  goods  market. 
Schneider’s (2009) study on fraudulent behavior in the car repair sector focuses on reputation 
concerns,  finding  no  influence  of  such  considerations  on  the  service  provided,  however. 
While  Schneider  (2009)  reports  that  overtreatment  and  undertreatment  are  pervasive,  he 
acknowledges that he “cannot rule out incompetence as a factor contributing to under- and 
overtreatment”  (p.  27).  Moreover,  unnecessary  repairs  might  have  been  caused  by  overly 
cautious mechanics who replaced parts to avoid possible malfunctioning in the near future. As 
mentioned earlier, such potential confounds are minimized in the market for taxi rides.
5 
We now turn to a short preview of our main findings. The average length of a ride was 
12.9 kilometers (km), of which on average 1 km (8%) was an unnecessary detour. Those 
passengers who revealed their unfamiliarity with the city were, on average, taken on detours 
of double length compared to passengers who did not. Overall, in 11% of cases passengers 
were overcharged through the application of incorrect tariffs. English speaking passengers, 
who probably conveyed the impression of not being familiar with the details of the tariff 
system, were overcharged in 19% of the cases, while this happened in only 7% of cases to 
Greek speaking passengers. Concerning the income dimension, we find that passengers in the 
role  of  having  high  income  are  taken  on  longer  detours  and  experience  slightly  more 
overcharging. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  II  we  provide  some 
background information on the taxi market in Athens, thus setting the stage for our field 
experiment.  Section  III  introduces  the  experimental  design  and  derives  our  hypotheses. 
                                                 
3 See List (2006) and List and Reiley (2008) for surveys on the advantages of field experiments. 
4 For instance, one of the findings of the laboratory experiments by Kerschbamer et al. (2009) and Dulleck et al. 
(2011) is that sellers’ distributional preferences have a large impact on their provision and charging decisions. 
It is far from clear, however, how this result translates to real world credence goods markets. By manipulating 
drivers’ perception of the income of passengers in our natural field experiment we can address this question. 
5 There is an interesting literature on the labor supply of (New York City) taxi drivers (see, e.g., Camerer et al., 
1997; Farber, 2005, 2008; Crawford and Meng, 2011). However, this literature remains silent on the question 
of  whether  and  to  which  extent  taxi  drivers  exploit  their  informational  advantage  over  customers  in  the 
provision of this credence good. Hence, we are not going into the details of these studies. 6 
Section IV presents the results on the determinants of different types of fraudulent behavior in 
this  market.  Section  V discusses  our  findings  along  with  different  explanations  for  them. 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
 
II.  THE MARKET FOR TAXI RIDES IN ATHENS  
The market for taxi rides is regulated nationwide in Greece. The regulation concerns 
both market entry and the tariff system.
6 Market entry is regulated through taxi licenses that 
are issued by a governmental authority and valid for a lifetime.
7 At the time of running the 
field experiment (in July 2010), approximately 14,000 taxi licenses were valid in Athens. This 
means that there were roughly 350 taxis per 100,000 inhabitants. This quota is noticeably 
larger than in some other cities. For instance, in London the comparable number is 280 taxis, 
in Berlin 210 taxis, and across the U.S. the overall average is around 110 taxis per 100,000 
inhabitants.
8 This comparison shows that the supply of taxi rides is relatively large in Athens. 
The tariff system is regulated such that there is a fixed fee for entering a taxi plus a 
variable fee, dependent on the time of the day, the distance traveled and the duration of a ride. 
This corresponds to a time-varying two-dimensional two-part tariff, a tariff type in place also 
in many other major cities, for instance in New York City. All over Greece, the tariff looks as 
follows (effective July 2010): On top of a fixed fee of €1.16, the distance-dependent tariff 
yields €0.66 per kilometer during daytime (i.e., from 5 a.m. until midnight) and €1.16 per 
kilometer during nighttime. By contrast, the duration-dependent tariff is invariable and yields 
€0.1775 per minute. The algorithm for charging is standardized nationwide in all taximeters 
and  it  switches  automatically  to  the  counting  method  (distance-dependent  vs.  duration-
dependent) that is more profitable for the driver. That is, if the vehicle’s speed during daytime 
is above 16 kilometers per hour (km/h), only distance is charged, while below 16 km/h only 
duration is charged. Under reasonable assumptions, it is then straightforward to show that it is 
more profitable for a taxi driver to take a passenger on a detour than to choose a shorter route 
                                                 
6 Many major cities also regulate both market entry and the tariff system. Examples include New York City, 
Paris, Brussels, Helsinki, and Quebec, to name just a few (see The New York City Taxicab Fact Book, 2006, 
Bekken, 2003, OECD, 2007, http://www.iedm.org/uploaded/pdf/aout2010_en.pdf). 
7 Lifelong licenses are also issued in Boston, Chicago, New York City, or Melbourne, for example (see Schaller, 
2005),  while  they  have  to  be  renewed  in  London,  for  instance  (see 
http://www.tfl.gov.uk/businessandpartners/taxisandprivatehire/1346.aspx#section-2). 
8  Source:  Own  calculations,  based  on  numbers  from  The  New  York  City  Taxicab  Fact  Book  (2006), 
“Transportation for London” (http://www.tfl.gov.uk/businessandpartners/taxisandprivatehire/1380.aspx), “Taxi 
Innung Berlin” (http://www.taxiinnung.org/Taxi-Bestellen.24.0.html), and Schaller (2005). 7 
on which he is likely to get stuck in a traffic jam.
9 As far as overcharging is concerned, the 
incentives  are  straightforward,  since  overcharging  increases  the  driver’s  revenue  without 
affecting the  cost of service.  It is important to  stress that the marginal incentives of taxi 
drivers to engage in fraud of any type do not depend on whether the driver owns or leases the 
vehicle,  because  leasing  a  taxi  comes  at  a  fixed  cost  (of  roughly  €35  per  shift;  see 
www.satataxi.gr) and no part of the revenue collected during the shift is shared  with the 
owner. Therefore, taxi drivers are always residual claimants, meaning that the possible profits 




III.  THE FIELD EXPERIMENT 
A.  Method and Procedure 
The experiment involved three experimenters switching between different passenger 
roles.  In  order  to  minimize  the  potential  for  confounding  effects  of  a  passenger’s  age  or 
gender on driver behavior, all three experimenters were male and in the late twenties. For 
each route, the three experimenters always took a ride from the same starting point to the 
same  destination.  They  approached  the  taxi  stand  one  by  one  in  intervals  of  one  to  two 
minutes, so that taxi drivers never saw them together. The short intervals were chosen in order 
to control for a host of unforeseeable factors, such as variations in traffic, road works, or 
accidents, that may influence the optimal route. In the following, we denote the three rides 
that were taken at practically the same time as a triple. 
Each experimenter always took a seat in the back of the taxi and he was equipped with 
a GPS satellite logger. This small device (see Picture A.1 in the Appendix) is easy to hide and 
allowed the experimenters to record the exact route driven, the total distance travelled, the 
exact duration of the ride, and the location and speed of the taxi at each point in time. In 
                                                 
9 Assuming an average speed of 40 km/h, a fuel consumption of 8.0 liters per 100 km while driving and 1 liter 
per hour while waiting, and a gas price of 1.3 € per liter, a minute spent on a detour during daytime yields 
€0.37 [=(0.67 km/min x 0.66 €/km) – (0.67 km/min x 0.08 l/km x 1.3 €/l)], which is considerably more than 
the estimated earnings of €0.16 [=(0.1775 €/min – 1/60 l/min x 1.3 €/l)] for a minute spent in a traffic jam. The 
incentives for overtreatment are even stronger during nighttime due to the more attractive distance-dependent 
night tariff, but in this study we collected observations only during daytime to keep the drivers’ incentives 
constant. 
10  This  is  often  not  the  case  in  other  credence  goods  markets.  For  example,  car  mechanics  or  doctors  are 
frequently employed for a fixed wage, which weakens their direct financial incentives for overtreatment and 
overcharging, thus making it much more difficult to observe and measure those types of fraud. 8 
addition to the GPS data, the experimenters collected data on the total fare, and the sex and 
approximate age of the driver. 
Our treatment variations were implemented as follows. In each triple of rides, the three 
experimenters were in three different “information roles”. We refer to them in the following 
as  local,  non-local  native,  and  foreigner,  respectively.  In  all  three  roles,  an  experimenter 
instructed the driver upon entering the taxi to take him to a particular destination. Passengers 
in the roles of locals and non-local natives did this in Greek, while passengers in the role of 
foreigners gave the instructions in English. Passengers in the role of non-local natives and of 
foreigners then asked the driver whether he knew the destination, adding as an explanation for 
asking that they were not familiar with the city. The question whether the driver knew the 
destination (plus the added explanation) is the only difference between locals and non-local 
natives, since both types of passengers talked in Greek. The language is the only difference 
between non-local natives and foreigners, both of whom had the same text when entering the 
taxi, one speaking in Greek, the other one speaking in English. 
In addition to an information role, each passenger also had an “income role”. We 
manipulated a taxi driver’s perception of the passenger’s income by varying the passenger’s 
clothes and (whenever possible) additionally the destination hotel. Passengers intended to be 
perceived  as  having  high  income  were  dressed  in  a  suit  and  carried  a  briefcase,  while 
passengers in the role of having low income were dressed casually and carried a backpack. 
For those routes where the destination was a hotel, a high-income passenger would drive to a 
top-end hotel, while a low-income passenger would have a low-end hostel as his destination.
11 
Table 1 summarizes our treatments and the number of observations per treatment. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In  order  to  ensure  randomization,  we  collected  observations  during  two  weeks, 
covering every day of the week and every time of day between 8 a.m. and midnight.  For the 
same  reason  (and  in  order  to  have  a  representative  sample)  the  observations  were  not 
collected  on  a  single  route,  but  on  15  different  ones,  covering  large  parts  of  Athens  and 
including rich and poor neighborhoods, as well as typical tourist spots.
12 Within each triple of 
rides, the order with which passengers in the different roles approached the taxi stand and 
                                                 
11 The two addresses were very close to each other in the same street, meaning that the distance was practically 
identical. 
12 Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix list all destinations and routes. Picture A.2 illustrates all routes in a map. 9 
took a taxi was randomized. On average, the three experimenters entered the taxis in intervals 
of 83 seconds one after the other. 
 
B.  Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis concerns the influence of the informational asymmetry regarding 
the optimal route to the destination on the extent of overtreatment by taking detours. Given 
that both non-local native and foreign passengers expressed to be unfamiliar with the city, we 
expected them to be more prone to be taken on detours than local passengers, because the 
latter  did  not  reveal  any  kind  of  unfamiliarity  with  the  city.  We  did  not  expect  to  see 
differences between non-local natives and foreigners since both were arguably perceived as 
equally poorly informed. We summarize as our first hypothesis: 
 
H1 (Information on the City): Non-local native passengers and foreign passengers are more 
prone to overtreatment than local passengers. The extent of overtreatment does not differ 
between non-local native passengers and foreign passengers. 
 
Our  second  hypothesis  refers  to  the  influence  of  the  informational  asymmetry 
regarding the details of the tariff system on the amount of overcharging. Passengers in the role 
of locals and non-local natives were likely to be perceived as reasonably well, and equally 
well, informed about the details of the tariff system, because the tariff system is identical 
across the whole nation. Foreign passengers were less likely to have such information, for 
instance, when the night-time tariff applies, whether or not surcharges are due for a given 
service, or that the driver is required by law to issue a proper receipt.
13 This informational 
asymmetry  makes  foreign  passengers  more  susceptible  to  overcharging,  as  stated  in  our 
second hypothesis. 
 
H2 (Information on Tariffs): Foreign passengers are more prone to overcharging than local 
passengers  and  non-local  native  passengers.  The  extent  of  overcharging  does  not  differ 
between local passengers and non-local native passengers. 
 
Our third hypothesis is motivated by the large evidence from laboratory experiments 
that distributional preferences are behaviorally relevant in many important market and non-
                                                 
13 See Picture A.3 in the Appendix for a sample receipt. 10 
market transactions (see Cooper and Kagel, 2011, for a recent review). Convex distributional 
preferences imply that a decision maker’s benevolence towards another individual increases 
(or that malevolence decreases)  as the income  of the other individual decreases  along an 
indifference curve (see Cox et al., 2008, for details). This is independent of the archetype to 
which a decision maker’s distributional preferences belong, i.e., whether the decision maker is 
altruistic,  inequality  averse,  spiteful,  maximin,  or  whatsoever.  Since  the  overwhelming 
majority of decision makers who are not exclusively interested in the maximization of their 
own material income has convex distributional preferences (for experimental evidence see, 
e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Andreoni and Miller, 2002, or 
Charness and Rabin, 2002), we expected taxi drivers to overtreat or overcharge low-income 
passengers less than high-income ones. This is recorded as our third hypothesis: 
 
H3 (Income): High-income passengers are more prone to overtreatment and overcharging  
than low-income passengers. 
 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
In total, the three experimenters took 174 taxi rides, which added up to 2,236 km of 
travelling through Athens and 63 hours of driving. The total cost for all rides was €2,112. On 
average, a ride was 12.9 km long, lasted for 22 minutes, and cost €12.14. All except five taxi 
drivers in our sample were male (97%). Each single ride ended at the requested destination, 
meaning that undertreatment by failing to reach the destination was not an issue.
14 
 
A.  Overtreatment 
In order to get a measure of overtreatment, we calculate an Overtreatment Index by 
taking for each triple of rides the shortest trip and normalizing the other two trips by the 
shortest one. Table 2 presents the results, showing an index of 1.03 for locals, and one of 1.08 
both for non-local natives and foreigners. The difference between passengers in the role of 
locals and each of the other two passenger roles is statistically significant (p < 0.05; two-sided 
                                                 
14 Note that we purposefully chose destinations that are easy to find, and hence taxi drivers always knew where 
the destination was. In case the driver asked which route to take, the choice was explicitly left to the driver. 11 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests
15). There is no significant difference between non-local natives 
and foreigners, however. These results support our hypothesis H1, because they show that 
passengers revealing not to be familiar with the city are taken on significantly longer detours. 
 
[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the Overtreatment Index 
for  each  of  the  three  information  roles.  It  confirms  that  local  passengers  experience 
significantly  less  overtreatment  than  both  non-local  natives  (p  <  0.05,  two-sided 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test)  and  foreign  passengers  (p  <  0.01),  but  there  is  no  significant 
difference between non-local natives and foreigners (p > 0.4). 
In the Appendix (Table A.3 and Figure A.1) we present – as an additional control and 
robustness check – a differently calculated measure for overtreatment that yields exactly the 
same insights. For this purpose, we first determined for each ride the shortest possible route. 
We did this by driving all the routes ourselves after the end of the experiment, following the 
directions  of  the  GPS  navigation  system  “TomTom”.  We  then  calculated  an  Alternative 
Overtreatment Index that divides the actually driven distance in a particular ride (derived from 
the GPS data) by the shortest possible distance. This index is 1.08 across all rides, implying 
that a ride’s average length of 12.9 km included a detour of about 1 km. Detours accounted 
for at least 5% of the shortest possible routes in 45% of rides. The Alternative Overtreatment 
Index is 1.05 for local passengers, but 1.10 for both, non-local native and foreign passengers 
(p < 0.05 when testing locals against each of the other two roles; two-sided Wilcoxon signed 
ranks tests). Hence, the results on hypothesis H1 are robust to this alternative specification. 
Of course, a longer and more costly route could, in principle, be driven by the desire 
of a driver to save on the passenger’s time by taking a quicker, albeit longer, route. This is not 
what we find in the data. In fact, the average duration of a ride was shortest for locals (21 
minutes  and  17  seconds),  intermediate  for  non-local  natives  (21:38  min),  and  longest  for 
foreigners (22:11 min). Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution function of a Duration 
Index, calculated as follows. We normalize each ride in a given triple by the quickest ride in 
that triple. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 therefore measures the relative duration of a ride in 
                                                 
15  For  these  tests,  we  match  the  observation  for  the  local  passenger  with  the  non-local  native  passenger 
(respectively  foreign  passenger)  in  a  triple  of  rides  and  apply  the  Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test  to  pairs  of 
matched observations in all triples. 12 
comparison to the quickest ride. While the figure reveals a tendency for longer rides with 
foreigners,  the  differences  in  the  distributions  among  the  three  passenger  roles  are  not 
significant according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
16 Hence, to say the least, the differences 
in the length of detours shown in Figure 1 are certainly not compensated by shorter travel 
times of those passengers that are being taken on longer detours. 
 
[Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
 
Turning  to  the  influence  of  the  income  role,  Table  2  shows  that  high-income 
passengers  have  an  average  Overtreatment  Index  of  1.09,  and  low-income  passengers  an 
index of 1.05 (p < 0.05; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test). Figure 3 presents the cumulative 
distribution  function,  and  it  confirms  the  smaller  Overtreatment  Index  for  low  income 
passengers (p < 0.05; two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Figure 4 shows the cumulative 
distribution  function  of  the  Duration  Index  for  high-income  and  low-income  passengers, 
revealing that the index is clearly higher for high-income passengers (p < 0.05; two-sided 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). This implies that high-income passengers are not only taken on 
longer detours, but it also costs them more time. In sum, the aggregate data on the influence 
of a passenger’s presumed income support hypothesis H3. 
 
B.  Overcharging 
Overcharging occurs when a passenger pays more than he should for a given distance. 
Since the actually driven distance could be reconstructed from the GPS data, thus allowing to 
control for overtreatment, overcharging was identified in our data if one of the following 
events occurred: (i) the driver switched to the more profitable night tariff even though the ride 
was during daytime; (ii) the driver did not switch on the taximeter at all, but at the end of the 
ride demanded a higher price than justified by the distance traveled and the duration of the 
ride; or (iii) the driver demanded an amount higher than the one shown on the taximeter, with 
the justification of bogus surcharges. 
In  total,  we  observed  overcharging  in  19  out  of  174  rides  (11%).  The  sources  of 
overcharging were the following. In only one case the taximeter was not switched on, six 
                                                 
16 Testing with a Jonckheere-Terpstra-Test whether the rides in a triple are ordered, such that they are quickest 
for local passengers, intermediate for non-local natives, and slowest for foreign passengers, yields p = 0.078, 
however. 13 
cases were due to the unjustified usage of the night tariff, and bogus surcharges accounted for 
twelve cases. Despite the relatively low overall frequency of overcharging, there are clear 
differences across passengers’ information roles, as can be seen in panel [A] of Table 3. 
While  overcharging  occurred  in  only  5%  (9%)  of  rides  with  local  (non-local  native) 
passengers, it happened in 19% of cases to foreigners (p < 0.05 for locals vs. foreigners; p = 
0.1 for non-local natives vs. foreigners; χ²-tests). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Panel [B] of Table 3 presents the average amount of overcharging by a passenger’s 
information and income role, conditional on overcharging having taken place. The average 
amount of overcharging in the 19 relevant cases was €4.30, which corresponds to 35% of the 
average fare. Concerning treatment differences, we note that the amount of overcharging is 
highest  with  foreign  passengers.  They  face  significantly  higher  amounts  of  overcharging 
when we test against the pooled data of Greek-speaking passengers, i.e., locals and non-local 
natives (p < 0.05; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 19). Controlling for a passenger’s 
information role, overcharging is also higher for high-income passengers than low-income 
passengers. 
Overall, the results on overcharging support our hypothesis H2 that predicted (i) more 
overcharging for passengers in the role of foreigners, and (ii) no differences between local and 
non-local native passengers. The data are also largely consistent with hypothesis H3, because 
high-income passengers pay, on average, more as a consequence of overcharging than low-
income passengers. While the difference is not significant with non-parametric tests (given 
the low number of observations), the regressions below will show a weakly significant effect 
of income on overcharging. 
 
C.  Total Fare 
Now we take a look at the total fare in the different treatments as an indicator of the 
overall amount of fraud. Table 4 presents a Fare Index that is calculated as the ratio of a 
passenger’s  fare  over  the  minimum  fare  among  the  three  rides  in  a  triple.  In  line  with 
hypotheses H1 and H2, we see that non-local natives paid higher fares than locals (Fare Index 
of 1.09 vs. 1.04; p < 0.01; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test), and that foreigners paid 
higher fares than non-local natives (Fare Index of 1.19 vs. 1.09; p = 0.05). The former result is 
largely driven by differences in overtreatment, while the latter is mainly due to differences in 14 
overcharging. On average, the Fare Index is higher for high-income passengers than low-
income passengers, but non-parametric tests fail conventional significance levels. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
D.  Econometric Analysis 
Table  5  presents  five  different  Tobit  regressions.  In  the  top  row  we  indicate  the 
dependent variables. As independent variables we use, first, a dummy for having expressed 
unfamiliarity with the city (¬local). This dummy captures passengers both in the role of non-
local natives and foreigners, and thus their presumed informational disadvantage concerning 
the optimal route to a destination. Second, we include a dummy for passengers speaking in 
English (foreign). This dummy is intended to reflect the effects of being less likely familiar 
with the tariff system than Greek-speaking passengers. Third, we add a dummy for high-
income passengers (high income). In specifications (2) and (5) we also include interaction 
terms of high income and ¬local, respectively foreign. In addition to these variables we insert 
further  controls,  such  as  the  driver’s  gender  and  approximate  age  and  the  time  of  day 
(measured in one-hour intervals from 8 a.m. to midnight).
17 To account for the fact that our 
observations are not independent of each other within each triple of rides, we cluster standard 
errors by set of three simultaneous rides. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Specification (1) presents a Tobit regression on the Overtreatment Index. The group of 
local passengers constitutes the benchmark group. We see that ¬local is significant and adds 
an estimated 9.6% of detours. This means that revealing unfamiliarity with the city increases 
overtreatment considerably. Being perceived as a foreign passenger does not further add to 
overtreatment (in comparison to a non-local native), which is in line with our hypothesis H1. 
High-income  passengers  are  taken  on  significantly  longer  detours  than  low-income 
passengers,  with  an  estimated  difference  of  6.1%.  This  is  in  line  with  hypothesis  H3. 
Specification (2) of Table 5 shows that including interaction terms of high income and ¬local, 
                                                 
17 We also tried specifications including route and day fixed effects. We dropped the fixed effects based on F 
tests of joint significance of the day and route dummies (p > 0.6 for day fixed effects, p > 0.8 for route fixed 
effects). 15 
respectively foreign, does not change the significance and direction of the main effects, while 
the interaction terms themselves are insignificant. However, the main effect of high income is 
restricted to local passengers, because the interaction terms offset the main effect of high 
income for non-local native and foreign passengers.
18 
Specification  (3)  presents  the  results  of  a  Tobit  regression  on  the  amount  of 
overcharging (in €). While conveying the impression of unfamiliarity with the city does not 
have a significant impact in itself (see ”¬local”), being in the role of a foreigner increases the 
amount of overcharging significantly by an estimated €5.15 (see ”foreign”). This matches our 
hypothesis H2, according to which passengers who are more likely to be perceived as having 
an  informational  disadvantage  about  the  general  tariff  system  in  Greece  face  more 
overcharging. Income plays a weakly significant role for overcharging, thus providing some 
support for our hypothesis H3.
19 
Finally, specifications (4) and (5) report Tobit regressions on the Fare Index, once 
with  interaction  terms,  once  without.  Here  we  find  that  both,  ¬local  and  foreign,  are 
significantly positive. This shows that both dimensions of informational asymmetries (on the 
optimal route and on the tariff system) contribute to a higher fare. The effect of high income is 
weakly significantly positive in specification (5), but restricted to local passengers, because 




E.  Summary of Main Results 
We conclude the results section by formulating three results, organized along the lines of our 
hypotheses: 
 
Result 1 (Information on the City): Consistent with hypothesis H1, we find that (i) non-local 
native  passengers  and  foreign  passengers  are  more  prone  to  overtreatment  than  local 
passengers,  and  that  (ii)  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  non-local  natives  and 
foreigners in the extent of overtreatment. 
 
                                                 
18 Wald tests yield p = 0.25 on the restriction high income + ¬local × high income = 0; p = 0.94 on the restriction 
high income + ¬local × high income + foreign × high income = 0. 
19 Due to the small number of observations on overcharging, the variable driver female had to be dropped here 
and another specification that adds interaction terms to the overcharging Tobit regression was infeasible. 
20 Wald tests yield p = 0.17 on the restriction high income + ¬local × high income = 0; p = 0.15 on the restriction 
high income + ¬local × high income + foreign × high income = 0. 16 
Result 2 (Information on Tariffs): Consistent with hypothesis H2, we find that (i) foreign 
passengers  are  more  prone  to  overcharging  than  local  passengers  and  non-local  native 
passengers,  and  that  (ii)  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  locals  and  non-local 
natives in the frequency and extent of overcharging. 
 
Result  3  (Income):  There  is  only  weak  support  for  hypothesis  H3.  While  high-income 
passengers are, on average, more prone to overtreatment and overcharging than low-income 




V.  DISCUSSION 
A. Explaining Treatment Differences Across Information Roles 
Differences  in  Detection  Probabilities.  Our  hypotheses  H1  and  H2  can  be  derived  by 
assuming that taxi drivers suffer a cost if they are detected as cheaters. Given such a cost, 
differences in passengers’ perceived information and the associated differences in detection 
probabilities translate into differences in the incentives for fraud. Hypothesis H1 relies on the 
assumption that the probability of overtreatment being detected is lower for passengers in the 
role of non-local natives or foreigners than for locals, while there is not much difference in 
this  probability  between  non-local  natives  and  foreigners.  Hypothesis  H2,  by  contrast, 
supposes  passengers  in  the  role  of  foreigners  are  perceived  as  less  likely  to  detect 
overcharging than passengers in the role of locals and non-local natives, while there is not 
much difference in the perceived probability to detect overcharging between locals and non-
local natives. 
To us, it seems plausible that a cost of detection exists in material or non-material 
form. Detection may have a material cost through penalties for fraudulent behavior, either as 
monetary fines or as the loss of a driver’s taxi license, thus expelling the driver from the 
business.  It  is  important  to  note  that  there  is  an  asymmetry  between  overtreatment  and 
overcharging with respect to potential material costs. A driver accused of overtreatment can 
always argue that he took a detour in the best interest of the passenger, for instance, to evade a 
traffic jam. There is no such excuse for overcharging. Thus, potential material costs are less 
likely to deter overtreatment than overcharging. Indeed, overtreatment was observed much 
more  frequently  than  overcharging.  While  45%  of  passengers  were  taken  on  detours  that 
accounted for at least 5% of the shortest route, only 11% of passengers were overcharged. 17 
Besides  the  potential  material  costs,  there  may  be  non-material  utility  losses  from 
being  detected  as  a  cheater.  These  may  arise  from  unpleasant  discussions  with  angry 
passengers about the route taken or the tariff applied. Moreover, a driver may feel ashamed or 
guilty if a passenger finds out that he was overtreated or overcharged. The theory of guilt 
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), for instance, implies that guilt averse subjects 
behave as if they have a cost of cheating on others. 
Differences in Reporting Probabilities. There is an alternative explanation for parts of 
our data patterns that relies on differences in reporting rather than differences in detection 
probabilities. Assume that the costs of reporting fraud to the authorities are smallest for local 
passengers, intermediate for non-local natives and highest for foreigners. Such an ordering 
arises, for instance, when locals know where to report, while non-local natives have to find 
out, and foreigners additionally face a severe language problem in communicating with the 
authorities. Under these assumptions one would expect the lowest level of fraud for local 
passengers, an intermediate level for non-local natives, and the highest level for foreigners. In 
fact,  this  matches  our  observations  concerning  the  Fare  Index  in  Table  4.  However,  this 
alternative explanation is hard to reconcile with the disentangled data on overtreatment and 
overcharging. Specifically, there is a treatment difference in overtreatment between locals, on 
the one hand, and non-local natives and foreigners on the other hand. There is no treatment 
difference, though, in overtreatment between non-local natives and foreigners. At the same 
time, there is a treatment difference in overcharging between the set of locals and non-local 
natives and the set of foreigners, yet no treatment difference in overcharging between locals 
and  non-local  natives.  This  pattern  is  hardly  consistent  with  an  explanation  relying  on 
differences in reporting probabilities, because differences in those probabilities are unlikely to 
depend on the fraud dimension. Note that our line of reasoning in this paragraph – and the two 
following  ones  –  depends  on  our  ability  to  disentangle  overtreatment  from  overcharging. 
Hence, the GPS data are also instrumental to discriminate between different explanations for 
our findings. 
Reputation  Concerns.  An  alternative  explanation  for  the  effects  of  a  passenger’s 
information role on the extent of fraud is related to reputation concerns of taxi drivers. The 
probability of repeated business might be perceived as highest for passengers in the role of 
locals, intermediate for non-local native passengers, and lowest for foreign passengers. If this 
were the case, then a driver’s incentive to give up short-term gains from fraud in expectation 
of larger future benefits from repeated business would vary with a passenger’s information 
role such that, on average, local passengers would face the lowest levels of fraud, non-local 18 
native passengers an intermediate amount, and foreigners the highest amount. In fact, this is 
what we find for the Fare Index discussed in Table 4, but this explanation does not fit the 
observed patterns of overtreatment and overcharging. This is so because differences in the 
perceived probabilities of repeated business across passengers should not result in different 
behavioral implications depending on the type of fraud. Finally, it is also worth mentioning 
that not a single driver ever offered a business card, mobile phone number, or the like in an 
attempt to secure another ride with this passenger in the future, making it rather unlikely that 
reputational concerns are an important factor for behavior in this market at all. 
In-Group Favoritism. An alternative explanation for the differences in the amount of 
fraud between locals, non-local natives and foreigners is in-group favoritism by taxi drivers 
towards  local  passengers  and  (possibly  to  a  somewhat  lesser  extent)  towards  non-local 
natives.
21 We consider this explanation as implausible. Specifically, the  finding that local 
passengers  are  taken  on  significantly  shorter  detours  than  non-local  natives,  while  the 
frequency of overcharging does not differ between both groups, combined with the finding 
that non-local natives are less often overcharged (but not less overtreated) than foreigners, is 
difficult to bring in line with a plausible in-group favoritism hypothesis that does not rely on 
different in-group definitions in the different domains of fraud in the market for taxi rides. 
 
B. Explaining Treatment Differences Between Income Roles 
Distributional Preferences. Our hypothesis H3 is based on the argument that decision makers 
with convex distributional preferences tend to behave more benevolently towards low-income 
than towards high-income passengers. Thus, if drivers have convex distributional preferences 
and if they perceive passengers in the role of high-income customers indeed as richer than 
low-income passengers, then they should cheat less on the low-income passengers. Result 3 
provides some support for this interpretation because we have observed, on average, more 
overtreatment and more overcharging with high-income passengers. Therefore, distributional 
preferences  seem  to  have  an  influence  on  the  provision  behavior  of  expert  sellers  of  a 
credence good not only in the laboratory (Dulleck et al., 2011), but also somewhat in the field. 
Result 3 has revealed that the effect is not significant across all information roles, however, 
                                                 
21 In-group favoritism refers to the phenomenon that decision makers tend to behave more benevolently toward 
members of their own group than toward ‘outsiders’. See Goette et al. (2006), Charness et al. (2007) or Fehr et 
al.  (2008)  for  experimental  evidence  that  in-group  effects  affect  behavior  in  distributive  tasks  and  in 
cooperation and coordination games. 19 
indicating that distributional preferences may only be a minor factor in explaining expert 
sellers’ behavior in our field experiment. 
Third  Degree  Price  Discrimination.  Instead  of  invoking  convex  distributional 
preferences, one could argue that taxi drivers apply price discrimination between low- and 
high-income  passengers.  However,  the  charging  decision  of  the  driver  is  in  a  sense  a 
dictator’s decision. At the end of a ride, a customer can hardly reject payment by arguing that 
the demanded fare is above his willingness to pay. This applies to high-income and low-
income passengers alike, meaning that the income role should not affect the fare for reasons 
of price discrimination. In fact, this is what we observe for non-local natives and foreign 
passengers. 
High-Income Passengers Suffer Less From Fraud. One might argue that high-income 
passengers were charged higher fares because taxi drivers expected them to be able to collect 
a refund of the travel expenses from a company. This could make the high-income passengers 
more willing to accept fraud (even if they detected it) than low-income passengers, because 
the latter would have to pay the consequences of the fraud out of their own pockets. Related 
to this argument is the experimental finding by Gneezy (2005) that subjects cheat more on 
others by lying more often when the costs imposed on the other person through lying are 
smaller. If high-income passengers were perceived as suffering less from overtreatment and 
overcharging – because they either can afford it more easily than low-income passengers or 
are more likely to get the expenses refunded – then the results of Gneezy (2005) would imply 
that  they  are  more  often  cheated  upon,  which  matches  the  aggregate  findings  for 
overtreatment and overcharging. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented the results of a controlled field experiment on the 
extent and the determinants of fraudulent behavior in the provision of a frequently consumed 
credence good: taxi rides. The first contribution of this paper to the literature on credence 
goods markets has been the exact and separate measurement of two frequent and serious 
problems in the provision of credence goods, i.e., of overtreatment and overcharging. Using 
portable GPS loggers we have been able to keep track of the taxi drivers’ routes in the city of 
Athens, Greece, meter by meter, allowing us to measure the extent of costly overtreatment. 
By letting a triple of passengers – each in  a different role – ask  for the same service at 
practically the same time we were able to control for a variety of unforeseeable factors, such 20 
as traffic jams. Given the data on the exact length of a route, we have then been able to 
identify the amount of overcharging. 
Overall, we have found that 45% of passengers were taken on detours that accounted 
for at least 5% of the shortest possible route. The overall average was 8%, or roughly 1 km of 
the average total length of 12.9 km. Overcharging through manipulating fares was observed 
relatively infrequently in 11% of observations. Recall that overcharging – once detected – is 
typically much easier to verify than overtreatment, because there are always possible excuses 
for taking a detour. From this it follows that the potential material costs of being detected (i.e., 
the  risk  of  being  fined  or  losing  one’s  license)  are  higher  for  the  taxi  driver  in  the 
overcharging dimension than the overtreatment dimension. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
overtreatment is much more frequent than overcharging. 
The second main contribution of this paper has been a controlled manipulation of (i) a 
passenger’s  familiarity  with  the  city,  and  thus  with  the  optimal  route,  (ii)  a  passenger’s 
presumed information about the taxi tariff system; and (iii) a passenger’s income. By doing 
so,  we  have  been  able  to  study  how  these  factors  affect  the  extent  of  fraud  in  the  two 
dimensions overtreatment and overcharging. Consistent with our hypotheses, we have found 
that passengers who are less likely perceived as knowledgeable about the optimal route are 
taken  on  significantly  longer  detours,  while  passengers  who  are  less  likely  regarded  as 
familiar with the (Greek) taxi tariff system are more extensively overcharged. Overall, our 
findings show that taxi drivers exploit their informational advantage over non-local natives 
and  foreigners  with  respect  to  the  optimal  route  by  taking  them  on  longer  detours. 
Additionally, they exploit their informational advantage over foreign passengers about the 
tariff system by overcharging them more frequently and by a higher amount. We have also 
found an influence of a passenger’s income role on fraud, with high-income passengers being 
taken on longer routes and being overcharged slightly more than low-income passengers. This 
hints at the possibility that distributional preferences might affect the provision of credence 
goods, as has been documented in the laboratory experiments of Kerschbamer et al. (2009) 
and  Dulleck  et  al.  (2011).  However,  the  effects  of  a  passenger’s  income  are  only  partly 
significant, and hence the influence of distributional preferences seems weak overall. 
Summarizing  on  a  more  general  level,  we  would  like  to  stress  that  the  lack  of 
knowledge on the consumer’s side on the type or quality of the good that generates the largest 
surplus and on the type of good received is detrimental for honesty in the provision of and 
charging  for  credence  goods.  This  is  obviously  a  pervasive  phenomenon  across  several 
credence  goods  markets.  For  example,  anecdotal  evidence  indicates  that  car  owners  with 21 
seemingly less knowledge about a necessary repair are more prone to fraudulent behavior by 
car mechanics than consumers perceived as having more information.
22 Another example is 
provided  by  Domenighetti  et  al.  (1993),  who  have  shown  that  with  medical  services  the 
probability  of  receiving  a  largely  unnecessary  treatment  is  negatively  correlated  with  the 
perceived knowledge of the patient about medical issues. Given this evidence and the results 
from our field experiment, it seems safe to conclude that better informed consumers are less 
prone to fraudulent behavior from the sellers’ side. This finding has practical implications, of 
course. Conveying to an expert seller the impression of  possessing relevant information (be it 
true or not), or at least refraining from revealing one’s lack of information, can alleviate the 
problems associated with the provision of credence goods. With car repairs, memorizing some 
technical terms might help, and in the case of medical treatment the existence of a (fictional) 
doctor in one’s family can be the key to an appropriate treatment. In the case of taxi rides, 
instructing the driver which route to take might be helpful to demonstrate an ability to verify 
the optimal route. This conveys one’s knowledge about the city or a willingness to take action 
against overtreatment. A related kind of safeguard against fraud in the market for taxi rides is 
provided by many conference organizers who are concerned about their participants and thus 
inform them in advance how much a trip from the airport to the venue typically costs. Judged 
on the basis of our findings this seems a sensible approach to protect participants from the 
possible downsides of their informational disadvantage in comparison to the expert sellers of 
the credence good studied in this paper, i.e., taxi rides. 
 
 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, the article “Your Wheels. More Women Are Beginning to Take Peek Under the Hood” in 
the Los Angeles Times, February 23rd 2000. 22 
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Table 1: Treatments 
    passenger’s income role   






























local  29  29  58 
non-local native  29  29  58 
foreigner  29  29  58 







Table 2: Overtreatment Index 
(normalizing each route by the shortest one in the triple) 
passenger’s role  low income  high income  total 
local  1.01  1.05  1.03 
non-local native  1.06  1.10  1.08 
foreigner  1.06  1.11  1.08 




Table 3: Overcharging  
[A] Relative frequency of overcharging 
passenger’s role  low income  high income  total 
local  0.03  0.07  0.05 
non-local native  0.00  0.17  0.09 
foreigner  0.21  0.17  0.19 
total  0.08  0.14  0.11 
 
[B] Amount of overcharging in €, conditional on overcharging 
passenger’s role  low income  high income  total 
local  0.94  2.43  1.93 
non-local native  n.a.  2.39  2.39 






Table 4: Fare Index 
passenger’s role  low income  high income  total 
local  1.01  1.07  1.04 
non-local native  1.07  1.11  1.09 
foreigner  1.19  1.18  1.19 
total  1.09  1.12  1.10 
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  -0.018 
(0.042) 




  -0.002 
(0.047) 












































Prob > F  0.009  0.015  0.024  0.006  0.017 
N = 174. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Overtreatment Index and Fare Index: Tobit regressions, left-censored at 1. Standard errors clustered by 
set of three simultaneous observations. Overcharged Amount (in €): Tobit regression, left-censored at 
0, robust standard errors. 
# ¬local is a dummy for passengers revealing that they were not familiar with the city (that is, for non-
local  native  passengers  and  foreign  passengers),  foreign  is  a  dummy  for  passengers  speaking  in 
English; high income is a dummy for passengers in the role of high-income passengers; time of day is 



























Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution of Duration Index by Passenger’s Income Role 34 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Destinations 
Name  Description 
Airport  E. Venizelos International Airport 
Glyfada  high-income suburb, southern Athens 
Karaiskaki Square  run-down neighborhood (central) 
Kifissia  high-income residential suburb, northern Athens 
Port (Piraeus)  main commercial and touristic port 
Syntagma  central square, foreigner area 
Train Station  main train station, all intercity trains 
Evangelismos  central Athens 
Abelokipi  middle-income neighborhood, close to city center 
Bus station  main  bus  station,  services  mainly  to  southern  and  central 
Greece 





Table A.2: Routes 
#  Origin  Destination 
1  Pagrati   Port 
2  Port  Karaiskaki Square 
3  Karaiskaki Square  Kifissia 
4  Kifissia  Syntagma 
5  Train Station  Port 
6  Pagrati  Glyfada 
7  Glyfada  Evangelismos 
8  Evangelismos  Glyfada 
9  Pagrati  Train Station 
10  Karaiskaki Square  Abelokipi 
11  Abelokipi  Bus Station 
12  Bus station  Port 
13  Port  Evangelismos 
14  Evangelismos  Port 
15  Airport  Evangelismos 
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Table A.3: Alternative Overtreatment Index 
(normalizing each route by the shortest possible distance) 
passenger’s role  low income  high income  total 
local  1.03  1.06  1.05 
non-local native  1.09  1.12  1.10 
foreigner  1.09  1.12  1.10 




























Picture A.3: Sample receipt 
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